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China's acquisitions abroad- 
global ambitions, domestic effects 
- - - - ---- .- . - . -  - . . - 1 \ -- - - - .~ 
The f o ~ ~ i n ~  e s sy  is based on a talk delivered to the Law Schwli lnrrmarional Law Workshop I 
on October 1 7,2005. 
I I '  v 
n the past year or so, the world has observed with seemiag 
;r. epidation what appears to be a new phenomenon-China's 
7 ,r; ' 
"stepping out" into the world economy. Tbi. move, labeled the 
I] (1 
,:i? "Going Out Strategy" by Chinese policy makers, sees China . d i'~ acting in the world not just as a trader of commodities and raw < : materials, or the provider of inexpensively-produced consumer 
1'1 goods for every corner of the globe, bat as a driven and sophla- 
",:; ticated acquirer of foreign assets and the equity in- in the 
7 .  
,'-I legal entities that control such assets. The Newkker  magazine, 
I '  , . 
- ever topical and appropriately humorous, highlighted this 
I I 
attention with a cartoon in its October 17,2005 edition. That 
$ drawing shows two prosperous and no doubt Upper East Side- 
- dwelling matrons holding cocktails before a fireplace. Above 
the fireplace hangs the formal portrait of a balding, well-fed, 
I .. elderly, man. Looking at the portrait, one lady says matter- 




The ChlOOC Md for U n o d  
This concern, and Yhe slightly nervous humor it engendered, - 
was idlamed by a Chinese oil company's summer bid for the 
control of an iconic American oil company, in direct competi- 
tion with a US. oil company suitor. That transaction was of 
course the Hong Kong-domiciled and listed China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd.'s (CNOOC Ltd.) June 2005 
all-cash US$18,5 billion bid for Unocal of California--at a more 
tkan 10 percent premium tij Chevron's competing stock and 
cash deal, already the subject of a bindiinglrnerger agreement. 
The anxiety-t least as articulated in the press, the U.S. 
Congress, @d at aaxious hearings in Washington-focwed on 
an eclectic but eye-catching range of issues. Some tlwndered 
grave warnings about the threat to America5 hational security'' 
genedyb and U. S. "ene@y security" specifidly (meaning 
U.S. access to' iwos1dwide hydrocarlson pmduction-and control 
of downetream refining, supply, and distribution); others 
worried vaguely about the transaaion as a harbinger of China's 
increasing economic, political, ad military influence; still 
dthers pointad to the phenomenon of a long-feared ~~ he." - 
udog Gmmunist-Ld government funds to finance am all Earh 
ded to better the American champion's cash and stock of5er. 
This latter characterization waa heled by the prospect of huge 
b o r x w w i u ~ h a p s  a third of the cash offer-from a ccmsm- 
ti- of banks led by the industrial and C o m m e d  B d  of 
China (ICBC), a People's Republic of C P  (PRC) state-med 
commercial bank, and from the CNOOC Ld's 70 percent 
shareholder, state-owned, and PRC-domiciled China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). StiIl others, ~ s h a p s  
trade lawyers sensing a rhetorical or business opportunity, 
went so far as to cry foul under the WorldZiade Opmzation 
(WTO) accession deal which China completed in November 
2001-labeling the proposed financing of the Unocal bid as a 
breach of WTO prohibitions against state subsidies, and thus 
actionable under the WTO (and the separate China-specific) 
I couatervaihg duties regime. 
In a Werent environment, each of these points could have 
been rebutted fairly easily. The worry about the "takeaver" of 
a U.S. oil company might have been answered by pointing out 
that more than 70 percent of Unocal's petroleum production, 
and more than 75 percent of its petroleum reserves, remain 
outside ofthe Umizd Stutes (ironically, w s d y  in Asia), and all of 
the Unocal production is promised to various foreign buyers 
(again, primarily Asian buyers) under long-term produc- 
tion sharing or production sales contracts. (In fact, Unocal's 
worldwide oil and natural gas production represented only a 
measly one percent of entire U.S. consumption.) For dawnstream 
assets (refining, pipelines, distribution, and retail)-where 
control issues become masginally more relevant-Unocal has 
no downstream assets whatsoever in the United States (having 
sold them almost a decade ago). The attack which portrayed 
CNOOC's soft or government-provided financing as an i l l eg  
subsidy was a stretch from any honest international trade 
lawyer's standpoint, as nothing about the proposed CNOOC 
acquisition, and its financing violated WTO rules on tmde (not 
investment)-related subdies, or the PRC's specific d t P  
men& upon its accession to the WTO, or under trade-related 
investment measurea (TRIMS) norms. The facw on Chin+e 
providers of finance, whetber state run b&, or the 70 percent 
state-owned shareholder of the bidder, somehow unifarmly 
failed to identi5 the critical bridge financing provided by such 
all-American financial institutions as Gohiman Sachs and JP 
Morgan, to be refinanced with CNOOC with debt h a n c e s  
(and signiscant m d m -  fees for the seme financiers) soon 
after completion of the deal: Clearly something else, something 
rather pernicious, was at work given the hastile reception that 
greeted CNOOC's effort to act on the world stage. 
The -/a rawng cy- 
"China &nY playing by the rules!" 
The CNOOC bid for Unocal also gave renewed voice to 
what already seems a tired refrain: "China doesn't play by the 
rules." Peter Robinson, the vice chairman of Chevron who 
led the public relations effort for the CNOOC competitor, 
remained "on [this] message." Whereas formerly the refrain 
had been heard on international trade matters and intellec- 
tual property rights protection and enforcement, it was now 
suddenly part of a heated chorus framing the far more sensitive 
sphere of cross-border acquisitions of controlling interests in 
U. S. -domiciled mega-corporations. 
The truth is that the CMOOC bid signaled something rather 
different, and given China's reforms over the past two decades, 
something more profound. Not only did the CNOOC effort 
represent another sigrufcant step in China's complex and 
broad-ranging interaction with the world generally, but far 
more critically, it signaled a striking new phase of the PRC's 
behavior-changing entanglement with foreign and international 
legal, commercial, and governance norms, all with dinct reform 
effects inside China. Thus, the CNOOC bid implicated precisely 
the opposite of a critique which accuses the PRC of 'hot playing 
by the rules." With the Unocal bid, China, its government, and 
various Chinese commercial instruments were forced for the 
first time to take cognizance of, and play by, internationally- 
accepted rules--not merely ip their business operations and 
external contracting, public disclosure, accounting practices, or 
the conventions of international M&A, but even with respect to 
internal corporate governance at the firms themselves. In th is  
way, we might see China's new acquisition activity outside of its 
borders rather more grandly-as an important mechanism for 
the encounter with, and absorption of, bedrocklvle ot 
concepts and practices. 
American per)creptCons of CMna and -the Chhresa, 
Chinese af f~lla&n c%p3tal in China 
In the 19= journalist and historian Harold Isaacs 
an important book on American perceptions of China 
and India titled Scmtches On Our Minds.The book synthesized 
the results Bf numerous surveys of Americans with respect to 
common ideas of those two great civilizations. Importantly, the 
surveys were directed to an "elite" population-in ~merica- 
diplomats, academics, well-traveled writers and intellectuals, , 
and multinational business leaders. Isaacs' idea was that!thk '1 ' 
perceptions of this group were in some ways more iip&rtant 
than those of the ~ m e r i c i  " e v e r y r n ~ . ~ ~ ~ i ~ s t ,  the eli e group \ \  
had in many ways encountered the reality of China and India, 
and might be thought to have realistic, nuanced impressions 
arising from such experience. Second, such~ersons would 
-by virtue of their leadership positions=-have an ongoing 
involvement in dealings with those sokieties and making or 
implementing U.S. policy towards China and India. Isaacs' 
s d  conclusion was that even these notionally well-educated, 
informed, and experienced policy makers and leaders operated 
with heads literally stuffed iyith damaging and siniplistic clichCs 
about China and India. In the Chinese case, these deep-seated 
attitudes swung between wildly divergent images of the "good" 
and "bad" Chinese, Ath no nuanced middle ground. On the . 
good side: Pearl Buck's oq-the-wp ~kistians, or cheerful, 
diligent, poor, innocent, peasants, and Charlie Chan-benign, 
humble, problem-solving, intelligent, and deferential; on the 
bad side, the diabolical, mysterious, shadowy, cannibalistic, 
sinister, Dr. Fu Manchu, or, collectively, the rampaging hordes 
constituting a "Yellow Peril" threatening to swamp and over- 
run American "civilization," or at least the American order. 
While the dichotomy that Isaacs identified may seem absurd or 
anachronistically racist in what we assure ourselves is a more 
enlightened age, it does seem to track nicely the dizzying swings 
in U.S. perceptions over the three decades between President 
Nixon's visits to Beijing and Shanghai in 1972, and current ideas 
about China as a distinct military, economic (commercial), 
and ideological "threat" or "strategic competitor." It does not 
seem an exaggeration to identify these deeply-ingrained and 
easily processed ideas as one set of views informing American 
approaches to China's accelerating investigation of overseas 
acquisitions. 
T'nhg the mirror, we might also point out &t Chinese 
e l i ~ s  have long had equally negative perceptions of foreign 
(and particularly Western) involvement in China-politically, 
ditarily, and of course commercially. This is a very long stay, 
not emily elaborated in this ldnd of presentation. SufKce to 
say that this &wed attitude was (and is) determined equally 
by xenophobia and the bitter experience of Western incur- 
sions into Qing Dynasty China from the early 19th ten*, . 
and through the Opium Wars and the "unequal treaties" which 
pried treaty ports and sovereignty over Hong Kong Island from 
China, which in turn served in large measure to de-legitimize 
and topple the last Imperial dynasty. Even people in China who 
regret the abuses and chaos of the Maoist era approve of how 
the Communist victory in 1948-49 forced out of China the 
"imperialist-coloniali~t" powers, the United States included. So 
it is not surprising then that on the eve of China's 1 979 history- 
changing "Reform &ia Opening to the Outside World" strategy, 
China's premier foreign language propaganda organ would 
proclaim: "We do not allow foreign capital to eKploit China2 resources 
nor do we run joint enterprises with foreign enterprises, still Iess beg 
themfor foreign loans" (from a 1977 Beijing Review). And yet, 
even before this statement was contradicted by thousands of 
Sino-foreign joint venfures, and China's rise to the status as the 
World Bank's largest borrower, there was an exception. Chinese 
policy makers had in fact started very early in the 1970s to set 
the groundwork for cooperation with foreign oil companies. 
This cooperation, focusing on hard-to-exploit "offshore" oil and 
gas fields (i.e., within China's sovereign seas, but not onshore or 
-. dry land), started in the late 1 970s, yet only after very sign&- 
cant Chinese internal disputes about a potential loss of sover- 
eignty¶ China's control of a strategic energy assets, and hidden 
foreign agendas seeking economic and political (and military) 
control. In fact, Chinese Communist Party elites in 1977 were 
saying exactly the same things about foreign participation in 
Chinese oil and gas production sharing arrangements as Senator 
Chuck Schumer, Chevron, and a large part of the U.S. House of 
Representatives were saying about a Chinese company's bid for 
control of Ulocal almost three decades later. That is one irony 
revealed in this particular corner of history; the other is that the 
commercial entity the Chinese government set up to bargain 
with and enter into production sharing contracts with the likes 
of Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, and others for the exploration, 
development, and production of these Chinese offshore oil and 
gas resources was none other than the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation, then as now known by its acronym, CNOOC. 
-- 
n o t ~ ~ w k i t ~ ~ "  
Some of the uglier visions conjured by the Isaaca survey 
in the 1950s seem to have been reanimated in 2004-05 by 
the spectacle of China's global ambitions. For Americans of a 
certain age, the present climate r ed l s  U.S. attitudes towards 
Japanese ambitions in the late 1970s and early 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  which 
were hostile even though Japan was a political and military d y  
for the United States. The signal transaction in those days was 
the acquisition by Japanese interests of an American icon- 
Rockefeller Center in NewYork City (perhaps closely followed 
by the Japanese takeover of the most American of businesses 
-Hollywood's Columbia Pictures.) Today, Chinese companies 
also seem to be chasing America's icons, with the ready help of 
America's own financial institutions acting as lenders, bridge 
lenders, or private equity co-investors. At the same time, many 
American companies, iconic or not, are actively seeking to be 
bailed out by Chinese capital-another interesting and ironic 
reversal on China's own use of foreign multinationals to h c e  
or save bankrupt state-owned enterprises in China in the very 
earliest days of the Chinese reform. And what icons they are: 
CNOOC's bid for Unocal, one of the original Standard Oil 
petroleum companies (the Rockefellers again); Shandong 
Hai'er's USS2.5 billion bid for Maytag (the defenseless Maytag 
repairman) ; Beijing Lenovo's US $1 .75 billion acquisition of 
,IBM's personal computer business (for Wolverine fans, a lesser 
"Blue"). And the falling "icons" are not only American. In recent 
years, the world has witnessed other developed economy 
properties coming under PRC control: TCL's acquisition of 
Thomson France's TV business (RCA) ; Shanghai Automotive's 
purchase of Korea's number four auto-maker (Ssarqyong 
Motors); the Minmetals bid to take over Canada's Noranda 
(also owner of Falconbridge); Nanjing Auto's takeover of the 
MG Rover assets in the United Kingdom; HuaweiTechnology 
of Shenzhen's stalking of Marconi. . . .The list seems to goes on 
and on, and worryingly for some outside China, seems to get 
longer. 
Haw we got here from there 
These acquisitions of iconic foreign industrial properties are 
in fact the culmination of a 25-year process of investment and 
financing-related interaction between China and the outside 
world. China's "Reform and Opening to the Outside World" 
policy of the late 1970s featured, among other things, domestic 
economic reform (and the slow march to a semi-marketized 
economy), construction of a legal system @mmdgati 
substantive law and r m e r y  of legal instituticm), increased 
trade with foreign natians, and the attraction of foreign sect almost = o m p a  used to fdliaw ajmple 
investment (FDI) into the PRC. trding activities,,yvi& f~rkjgn purchasers or andora. n a t  
At least fi.0111 the Chinese side, FDI , was understood from situation changed radically in the late 1990s, when individual 
its earliest days as a way to attraot hard currency financing ~hihese nterprises-ome old-style state-owned or controll 
for China's bankrupt state-owned or conkrolled assets, and actors, others fiercely independent Chinese campanies-begm 
gain additional benefits like foreign technology, madagement to look actively for investment deals abroad, a set of ambitions 
how-how, *ibution and m a r k h g  s m ,  and fordgn sales only subsequently sanctioned and supported by central policy 
channels for hard currency-earning exports. Fareign capjza makers under the sotcalled "Going Out" strategy. It is again 
seemed happy to do its part, by donating capitd, technology, beyond the scope of this presentation to speculate in detail 
and management expertise into China, all for a chance on what is behind the now acknowledged fact of the ' '~bink 
--however tightly restricted--at the rumored nirvana of one 
billion Chinese consumers. Regardless of the motivatrons 
on either side of the equation, the FDI program did serve as 
the exclusive vehicle for early introduction of great areas of 
commercial, corporate, and financial law into China, including 
items as basic as corporate legal personality, transferable 
equity interests, separation of owners and management (and in 
management, between a board and an executive corps), and a 
market for equity interests in enterprises. 
In the early 1990s, China began to look to another 
mechanism to raise finance for the same moribund state assets 
-the domestic and then international capital markets. These 
ambitions spurred "corporatizationn of asset groupings in China, 
and the issuance of stock by such new corporations to both 
domestic and foreign investors buying on China's new stock 
exchanges, and very q a y ,  foreign investors buying on foreign 
e x c h a n g e d  Hong Kong, then NewYork, then London, then 
Tokyo, and so on. Overall, this second interaction with the 
international capital markets-again, featuring Chinese issuers 
raising funds from foreign capital providers-proved beneficial 
for Chinese commercial legal developments, by introducing 
foreign securities laws and exchange regulation, a new world 
of disclosure and legal eriforcement (both administrative and 
through private rights of action), international accounting 
standards, and internal governance requirements. 
And yet, even as China saw the establishment of ever .greater 
numbers of in-country FDI prLjects, or listings of China- or 
Hong Kong-domiciled issuers on the NewYork Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) via Securities and Exchange Commission-registered 
offerings, the Chinese government proved positively shy in 
calling Chinese enterprises to fuW their destiny outside of the 
embrace of the PRC--allowing only tentative forays first into 
Hong Kong, and then in Southeast Asia. While large Chinese 
Outn strategy, or what high policy aims call for its rhetorical ' 
support by the central government. Qere, one might point to 
the need of these companies to procure stable access to certain 
kinds of resources, and/or technology. Other, more manufac- 
turing oriented companies are clearly after Eeign distribu- 
tion channels and thus access to foreipmarkets, better profit 
margins in better-developed product markets, and use of estab- 
lished "global" brand names. And certainly many bold and rather 
far-seeing Chinese managers believe they need to "Go Out" 
to test and strengthen their companies in a truly competitive, 
and global market, far removed from the cozy mokopoly-based 
market that remains a substantial part of China's industrial 
economy. 
For present purpdses, it is moat important to recognize that 
the "Going Outn strategy is in most cases being led by Chinese 
enterprises themselves, rather than the central government. 
(For instance, in late 2005, it was revealed that the CNOOC 
bid for Unocal was undertaken almost entirely at the initia- 
tive of CNOOC, and over the fierce objections and stubborn 
hesitations of PRC central government actors. This may have 
lulled CNOOC executives [and their advisors] into a false sense 
of achievement. Perhaps they thought if they had managed 
to convince their political masters to allow them to proceed 
with the bid, it would be so much easier to convince Unocal 
shareholders to accept the higher price offered.) In addition, 
the Chinese government has in the last two years also created 
or ameliorated the legal basis for such outbound investment 
activity, and thus conformed the law (or removed legal restric- 
tions) which had previously worked ta restrain such activity. 
(Here, most of the restrictions were sourced in foreign 
exchange regulation and government permiasions for offshore 
holdings.) Most important, this outbound ~ u s h  as caused the 
i - -  
, . ,= , rf. 4 - 7 ,  ! , .,. L7-sr L,< Lb +;A ,,... $&7&~~:: r -  *--,,--&&-. ~>,~&+&$$~~yjj b.2 - 
Un-1 is "shopped"-discussions with both i &larch 29-36two-day meeting of CNOOC Ltd. b o d ;  
I _ foreign, non-executive, directors are informed of a potential .: r' ChevronandCNOOC; . , bid for the first time, and vote to block CNOOC Ltd. bid; 
- r  December 2 L U n c a l  and CNOOC Chairman meet to CNOOC signals to Unocal that a bid will not be forthcoming 
- ::. discuss a possible deal (CNOOC Ltd. board na,+yised of on March 30; 
the meeting); . , .  I 
- , .  0 March 3LUnoca l  board, upon receiving Chevron5 revised 
7 4  . -. *I . - .; 8005 . !, . -; -,;* 2 I offer of March 29, decides to terminate negotiations with - > '  - 
January & b c i d  firnu reports t h a t - c ~ ~ o c  consid- ENI, and gives CNOOC until April 2 to make m offer; 
%' - -. - ering m a g  a bid for Unocral; Los A n g b  Times repm a March 31--CNOOC Ltd. board meets, but is still unable to 
CWDUC bid af US$13 billion; agree on the mmlung of sn offer, or n price; one foreign, non- 
e Jmuary &Chevron delivers a letter to U n o d L  indicating executive, director r e s i p  for "health reasons"; 
strong ihterest in purchasing b K d ;  , ' l i l  . April 1-CNOOC board in disarray, not even able to 
J Jzmuary-early Feipaary-CNOO C lobbies PRC govep- - convene a board meeting; 
meat departmengin prepktratiq , for . a possible bid fpr . - or , April 1-the day before m anticipated bid horn CNOOC 
. . - Y .  LIma3.; * .  - h - Ltd., Chevron agrees to sweeten its bid again, by giving 
9 Fehuary ZkChevron% initial bid: all share de$. 0,94 Unocal shareholders a choice of an d share deal, cash and 
Chevron shares for each share of Unocal; share deal, or all cash deal: (i) 0.7725 Chevron shares plus 
US$16.25 for each Unocal share; (ii) 1 .OS Chevron shares for 
8 February 2CUnocal  board determines that Chevron's ; 7; each U n o d  share; or (iii) US$65.00 per Unocal share; 
< .  offer is insUmcient; , , . '  I is.:- .** April 2-Unocll board meets, decides to make a final 
Much l - ~ m & k ~ o & e s  Chevron ha t  the February 26 . ..;;,+ dedsion on April 3; Chevron hid is refkid; 
April 3--CNOOC Ltd. board meets again, but is still unable 
: - 0 March I-Un-1 in contact with CNOOC and EN1 ftaly) 
-L L 8  to make rn offer; 
as alternative bidders, and gives each until March 7 to offer a 
price; : , , - April 1 U n o c a l  and C h o n  sign a definitive merger 
agreement for combined wh/stock deal with Unocd, at 
~ u c h  7-CNOOC Ltd. communicates preliminary bid value of US$60.65 per &are (US$16.5 billion) (this indudes 
rage of USS59.00-62.00 per U n d  A m  (USS16.0-16.8 ' ' aforce-*e-Mte" clause ar ac9uirer can force Und - - billion)-immdately rejected by Unacal; board to put the Chevron bid to a Unoml shareholder vote] 
- * Mmck 29-Chevron raises its February 26 bid 10 percent and US$500 million '%re& up" fee). 
--still an all share deal, 1.03 Chevron shares for each share of 
Unacal; 
1 
full range of Chinese actors-from government departments to 
enterprises to individual managers and investors-to encounter 
a whole menu of laws, regulations, institutions, customs, 
and more, that govern and shape investment and commercial 
activity in political economies outside of China. 
bid far Unocal during th,e s m e r  of 2005. As it developed, 
the pmped trimsation involved CNOOC Ltd.-the Hong 
Kong-doded,  70 percent-wotra~ed , subsidivy of Beije's 
purely state-owned enterprise, China National O a o r e  011 
Corpontion w aCNOOC"-md&g d cad bid for Un~cal, 
b t  bid supported by pmposcd finmhg of mom than US$7 
billion f i ~ m  CNOOC (to be mapped for h s  in CNOOC 
Ltd. witbin twD yews) sod W$6 billion fPam s sydcate led by 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), but vgith 
JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs participating with bridge 
financing (to be taken out with the issuance of debt by CNOOC 
Ltd. after completion of the acquisition of Unocal). 
The major points tirneline for the rise and fa1 of CNOOC's 
efforts may be recited as follows: At the end of 2004, Unocal 
was being "shopped" in America and internationally. In 
December of 2004, CNOOC was approached by Unocal, with 
Unocal executives asking CNOOC if the Chinese company 
would be interested in acquiring the American company. At 
the beginning of 2005, the Financial Times reported (falsely as 
it turned out) an imminent bid for Unocal from CNOOC. 
This, perhaps by design, conjured an immediate indication 
of "strong interest" from Chevron on January 6, and then a 
formal all stock bid from Chevron on February 26, valuing 
Unocd at over US116 billion. All through this period, and 
then March, CNOOC was not able to make a bid-the bid 
requested ofit  by Unocd-because independent directors on 
the board of CNOOC Ltd. could not be pehaded to vote in 
favor of such an action. (Their formally articulated concerns 
focused on the crushing debt load CNOOC Ltd. would have 
to take on to complete the purchase, and the hugely dilutive 
effects for non-CNOOC shareholders of future, necessary, 
issuances of stock by CNOOC Hang Kong. These outside 
directors may in truth have been alienated by the way in which 
the proposal was brought to them by CNOOC executives and 
CNOOC Ltd. executive board members at the last minute, 
and seeking a "rubber stamp.") Insiders also report real battles 
between CNOOC executives and the highest-level Chinese 
central government actors, many fiercely opposed to the 
proposed takeover bid by a Chinese company for an American 
oil company. Unocal finally gave CNOOC Ltd. until April 2 
to post a bid, which caused Chevron to raise its own offer on 
April 1 . CNOO C Ltd. remained styrmed at the board level, 
and thus with no Chinese bid forthcoming over the night of 
April 2 - 3, Unocal signed a binding merger agreement with 
Chevron on April 3,2005, valuing Unocal at approximately 
US$16.5 billion. In an example of skilled lawyering, the 
Chevron lawyers included in h e  merger agreement a "force the 
vote" clause, which contractually obligated Unocal, at Chevron's 
drection, to convene a shareholders' meeting to approve the sale 
to Chevron. (This made the Chevron strategy going forward 
rather s imple i f  and when a competing Chinese bid was 
forthcoming, Chevron needed only to introduce doubt into 
the minds of Unocal shareholders about eventual U.S. govern- 
I Revised contest 
GNOOG lv945Wm iks fray 
- + June I--% Chengp, Chairmadl of CNOOC and 
CNQOC Ltd., works to convince CNOOC Ltd. board that 
CB00C Ltd. should make offer for ~ d ;  
I 
' *  June I&U. s . Federal Trade Commission raises no 
i abjection to Chewon-Unocal merger; 
- d Early June-Continued resistance on CWOOC Ltd. 
board fmm foreign-dtiza independent directors-they3! , 
articulate concern about the mushing debt load CNOOG.5: 
Ltd. would haw, and the diiutive impact on minority share: 4; 
halders;, eta ; 'k >*: 
June 22-CNOOC Ltd. board votes unanimously to . . 
- d e  bid (Golban Sahs-employed independent director I 
abstaining to mdd "ro&ct of interest"); t 
9 J&xe 2H----C1\50QC Ltd. makes bid for Unocd- 
US467 .W per share ax- US$18.S 'bibon, all cash (1 1 -,, Y +  
percent higher than Chewon's signed ZISS16.5 billion r 
afiet-1; 
6 June 22-mitt Jtaly-CNOOC ttd. md Unocal negotiate 
&aft Merger Agreement in NewYork; 
June 24-41 members OFUS. Congress s a d  letter ta 
- 1 
President Bush urging a "thoraugh review" of the CNOOC 
Lzd. offer; 
-r C -June 30--U. S. Home of Representatives votes 33 3- > 
92 to bar the U.S. Treanuy From using any of its funds I - - - ta 'meommend approvalu d the CNOOC Ltd. bid per - 
' I  
- .  
: - , #  . the CAUS pm-; and 398- 15 non-binding resolu- 
j' 1 '' ; tim, expresz$ng coneern bt tbre CNOOC Ltd. bid, if 
- emplaed, could'heat~n to impair wtiona1 securityw . I (CEIpS stm&rd); 
, * 
- i Juae 3L-U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
. approves pmxg a d  tender dfer materials for &mn- % 
Unaml deal; 
+ July 1-CNOOC Ltd. makes pre-cmptive request of . 
- CRIB to cornmewe lnvestigatio~ of announced CNOOC , - 
ment approval, force a shareholders' meeting, and allow the 
Unocal shareholders to approve the bird in hand (Chevron's 
lower-priced deal) over a possibly unstable but richer option 
[CNOOC's higher bid] .) Soon thereafter, the shareholders' 
meeting required under the governing merger agreement was 
set for later in the same summer-August 10,2005. 
More than two months later, CNOOC management finally 
cajoled the dissenting CNOOC Ltd. board members into place, 
a Mid-JuSy-PEh C-J 2%~ 
PRC might 
the Wtd 
and on June32 CNOOC Ltd. announced a much higher bid for 
U n o d  (LIS$18.5 Ucxn), d an all 4 at that. &won 
be,diiwly mt inta d a n ,  mjuring &E -5 fw ,  aad 
c-rm fidd to at bBti3.T-t Qf& prmmbW. At &Ah 
p&t, CNO OC's nnly bop@ ww tBst the palitid unee-ty 
i x x u n d a q  rumored fw the C b b s e  bid d d  be *a& a non- 
h~ue by wlyB  I y p ~ c h e ~ i d ,  appval  d tihe C ~ ~ , B S E  Lacrqui&itjm 
by the CP-B~D. cm h & g n  In~sment in the Lb&md S@w 
(CFIUS), the U.S. government interagency group tasked with 
analyzing foreign bids for American assets or equity interests 
under Exon-Florio. (If Unocal shareholders were permitted 
to believe that the acquisition would be approved by the U.S. 
government, they would likely have rejected the lower Chevron 
bid to take more value [and all in cash] under the CNOOC 
offer.) Those hopes were dashed when, on July 7, the Bush 
administration's National Security Advisor let it be known 
Unocal directors were still required to fulfill their fiduciary 
to recommend either the agreed Chevron deal or the higher 
CNOOC bid, but asked CNOOC for its final "best offer." That I 
was forthcoming a day later, when CNOOC raised its bid to 
US$69.00 per share. Three days later, Chevron raised its own 
agreed offer---albeit to a level still lower than the Chinese bid, 
China and "China threat" rhetoric in the American Congress 1 
. ,:g grew almost unbearably over-heated, with several legislators - .  - (-. 
-:%& 
introducing bills specifically targeting CNOOC's proposed 
-, -, 
L*.;,~: acquisition of a U.S. energy company. CNOOC decision :ii@ makers saw that no bid hom a Chinese company, no matter 




sigdicant political hurdles now in place. Accordingly, CNOOC 
formally withdrew its offer for Unocal on August 2,2005. On 
Unocal with Chevron. 
child of enmeshment with W e  rukm 
many ways, the critiques and fear-mongering targeted 
n CNOOC proved almost cruelly ironic. For CNOOC is 
ot the mere agent of a newly rapacious Chinese superpower, 
plemented notions of transparency, disclosure, and internal 
observers simply must differentiate between the origins 
and control of the Chinese players now stepping onto the world 
For instance, Lenovo, which acquired IBM's PC business 
rence to the fact that the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Chinese social academic unit under the State Council- 
one of the o r i g i ~ l  promoters of Lenwo (then " 
hardware in China. (The Chin 
- 8 * 
acted to facilitate capital accumulation and irivestment, and in fact a direct creation [as the name indicates] of the former 
foregone some tax revenues in exchange for a small equity Ministry of Metallurgy.) 
interest, but not kept a strong hand in the running of what is an Each of these examples should prod us to, examine closely 
entrepreneurial business controlled by a charismatic individual. the genesis and nature of Chinese enterprises increasingly active 
(This of course is not to say that all PRC entities identified as on a global scale, such as CNOOC specifically. Far if CNOOC 
"state-owned" are innocent of state or government control is representative of anydung, it is for identification of domestic 
-MinMetals, the proposed acquirp of Noranda in Canada, is and internal firm effects arising from China's or "China 1nc.i" 
Nicholas C. Howson delivers his lecture . . . 
participation in the global economy and commercial legal 
order. CNOOC's path is emblematic of the path future Chinese 
enterprises will walk as they truly "Go Out" into the world 
-first, developing their business in an increasingly marketized 
domestic economy functioning under law; then, after corpo- 
ratizition, pursuing business activities under a host of objec- 
tively-rendered commercial, legal, financial, and corporate 
governance constraints; then raising capital on developed 
overseas capital markets and encountering the sigzllficant 
demands of foreign securities and exchange regulation; and 
finally, in the process of making offers for public and private 
foreign companies, working with and being shaped by a wholly 
ditrerent legal, contractual, and regulatory context, from the 
negotiation of sophisticated acquisition agreements (enforce- 
able before courts or arbitral bodies) to the complete range of 
takeover regulation and proxy rules. In addition, there will no 
doubt be serious and sustained enmeshment with other regula- 
tory systems if and when Chinese companies are successful in 
gaining control of foreign industrial propertieefor example, 
other than ongoing corporate disclosure and securities regula- 
tion (in the post Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] United States, increas- 
ingly pertaining to internal firm governance), environmental, 
occupational health and safety, labor, pension, etc. stipulations. 
(Consider the experience of Lenovo as it moved its headquar- 
ters to the United States, and suddenly found its operations and 
work force largely subject to a whole nest of foreign laws and 
regulations. ) 
The CNOOC case specifically is highly instructive. CNOOC 
was conceived in the late 19709, and formally established in 
the early 1980s, as a corporate representative of the sovereign, 
or the People's Republic of China. (This happened even before 
there was a corporate law in China, much less a law formally 
governing state-owned enterprises [or "enterprises owned 
by all the people'?.) Having made the politically sensitive 
decision to invite foreign oil companies into commercial 
production sharing arrangements to explore, develop, and 
hopehrlly produce from China's then untapped offshore oil 
and gas resources, China needed to create, from whole cloth, 
an entity which could sign production sharing contracts with 
interested foreign concerns. CNOOC was thus established, 
given franchise rights over exploration areas (and contract 
blocks within those areas), and commenced accepting bids 
from foreign parties for the negotiation and implementation 
of such production sharing arrangements. (Distinguish the ' 
other twa large national oil companies from the PRC: China 
National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC], now known as I 
~ e t r o ~ h i n i ,  was effectively the encapsulation of the ''upstream: 
onshore-focused, liqe ministry,  the h e t r y  sf Petroleum 
I Industry; Sinopec, the other major Chinese oil company, 
was the monopoly participant in all "downstream" acti9tiq. ,, , 
A reorganization in the late 1990s saw CNPC and Sinopec 
I 
swapping some [onshore] upstream and downstream assets, 
\ \  
while CNOOC aggressively developed greenfield downstream 
projects but gave up none of its offshore p r o d u ~ o n  sharing 
contracts entered into with foreign concer@.0ver more than 
two decades of work, CNOOC concluded r a large number of 
production sharing deals, entered into with some of the world's 
most sophisticated oil and gas companies, all focused on finding 
and extracting hydrocarbons from offshore blocks. In those 
two decades, many saw CNOOC as the exemplar of a new 
k i d  of Chinese concern-dmittedly a corporate front for 
the state, but forced to enter into detailed production sharing 
contracts (subject to binding international arbitration) modeled 
closely on contractual forms used by Indonesia and Brazil, with 
key input from Norway's national oil aompany. (CNPC, the 
state-owned enterprise successor to the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry, was never forced to do this in its upstream work, and 
was only permitted to enter into production sharing contracts 
with foreign oilers in 1994.) While a step forward for the intro- 
duction of law and legal instruments into the basic life of one 
of China's largest concerns, many of these facially sophisticated 
contracts were not subject to a great deal of negotiation (except, 
for a narrow set of comm&rcial terms, and the negotiable 
"X factor" which divided up production based on different 
volumes achieved). And yet, these contracts did provide, for the 
first time in reform-era China, extremely detailed contractual 
arrangements governing a joint project's exploration, develop- 
ment, and production phases, sophisticated tracking of expenses 
and investment to effect cost and then investment recovery, and 
allocation of revenue sharing (after investment and cost recov- 
eries were fully paid out) very similar to the "waterfalls" seen in 
U. S. -style partnership agreements. Moreover, these relation- 
ships between CNOOC and foreign oilers were implemented 
as commercial contracts subject to binding dispute resolution 
(as opposed to state-to-8tat.e relatiomhips or bureaucratic 
co-mds), d were (and are) actually contested in sweral 
arbitrations or threaten~d arbitrations over the years. 
CNO 0 C 's second major brush with law, and markets 
operating under some kind of rule of law, was the listing on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange of a newly-created and 70 
percent-owned sub~idiary-CNOOC Ltd., the summer 2005 
suitor for Unocal. (The benefit of many of the better produc- 
tion sharing contracts originally entered into by CNOOC with 
foreign companies was assigned to this Hong Kong-domiciled 
listing vehicle.) That phenomenon left CNOOC, qua the 
representative of the PRC on numerous production sharing 
contracts, learning many of the same hard lessons absorbed by 
other Chinese state-owned firms seeking finance in developed 
capital markets. CNOOC went through a difficult period of 
corporate reorganization, property (contract) rights transfers, 
and abundant public disclosure, all in the service of capital 
raising from mostly foreign investors (granted relatively little 
governance power in exchange for their share investment). The 
process even allowed CNOOC to encounter the fickle capital 
markets, with CNOOC Ltd.'s first attempt at an IPO in 1999 
pulled back at the last minute and then re-launched in 20Q1. 
Some may object to any portrayal of the 2001 CNOOC 
Ltd. listing in Hong Kong as progress in the terms argued here, 
pointing to the unhealthy phenomenon of an entirely dominated 
listing subsidiary, and a 30 percent body of passive and disem- 
powered public shareholders positioned alongside an uncon- 
strained and 70 percent controlling (Chinese state) shareholder. 
This would be wrong, as it fails to take account of the Hong 
Kong, U.S. and NYSE securities and exchange law and regula- 
tion which immediately impacted CNOOC Ltd.$ internal 
governance (especially after the passage of SOX), the real 
rights of minority shareholders under those external regulatory 
systems, and transactional rules which call for disinterested 
director or shareholder votes, exchange approvals, or the like, 
prior to implementation. Again, realists might see shareholder 
votes mandated at any 70 percent single shareholder-cantrolled 
company as an empty formality. CNOOC itself disproved this 
view when in 2004 another of its Hong Kong-listed subsidiaries 
-China Oilfield Services 1nc.-was blocked from diverting 
40 percent of its US$148 million revenue to another CNOOC- 
controlled PRC-domiciled finance entity. Sixty-three percent 
of the China Oilfield Services Inc. shareholders voted to block 
the diversion of h d s  from one CNOOC subsidiary to another, 
&at shareholder vote being required by Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange rules. (It is fascinating to see these same transac- 
tional rules, many of which limit the opportunism of control- 
ling shareholders, subsequently imported directly into the 
domestic Chinese legal system, via China Securities Regdatory 
Commission and Shanghai Exchange regulation.) 
Aspects of the U n o d  bid experience itself support the idea 
that CNOOC and its top management, in seelung to act outside 
of China, encountered serious constraints on their behavior 
that they would never have faced were CNOOC acting as a 
large SOE in a purely Chinese context. CNOOC was forced to 
engage directly with accepted or mandated corporate gover- 
nance norms and rules designed to protect real (and minority) 
shareholders. It is now known that CNOOC executives were 
intent on having CNOOC Ltd. launch a bid for Unocal in 
the early part of 2005, but that the transaction was frustrated 
solely due to the opposition of at least one and perhaps several 
independent (and all foreign national) board members at the 
CNOOC Ltd. level. (While various rationales are rumored for 
the objections, suflice to say that the non-executive CNOOC 
board members may have harbored resentments over the 
way in which the parent company and its leaders went to the 
full CNOOC Ltd. board at the very last minute as a 'kubber 
stamp.") Observers outside China must recognize what a 
profound difference this represents: When previously would any 
Chinese state-run giant, even if "corporatized" (or "refomed'* 
into a corporation with a board of directors, executive manage- 
ment, shareholders, etc.) have been constrained in any way 
on a proposed acquisition, especially by board-level actors? 
CNOOC Chairman Fu Chengyu, by June of 2005 forced by 
his non-executive directors to delay the bid for 6 long months, 
and then re-enter the battle with an offer for Unocal that was 
for US$2 billion higher than the bid CNOOC might originally 
have made, said tellingly, if rather wistfdly, "Our independent 
directors believed they needed more time to further evaluate the wlue 
of Unocd. This showed the good practice of corporate govanan~e.'~ 
Rarely in the history of China's reform has the LLgood practice 
of corporate governance" been so keenly felt--or so costly! 
Even when the board of CNOOC Ltd. was finally cajoled into 
launching the bid (and not without some continued resistance 
from CNOOC Ltd. board members and aspects of the PRC 
central government), the Hong Kong-listed company would. 
have been forced to gain the approval of a s&cient number of 
its public shareholders, as required under Hong Kong corporate 
law and rules governing issuers listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. And finally, of course, if the bid was to be allowed to 
go forward, it would have had to comply with the web of U.S. 
public takeover regulation, including the Williams Act (Section 
14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 9 34 (34 Act)) and 
the tender offer rules, the notifications required under Section 
13(d) of the 34 Act, continuing disclosure by the bidder and its 
controlling shareholders, and been subject to the full scope of U.S. 
anti-manipulation and anti-fraud rules and jurisprudence, not to 
mention the rather sobering civil liability provisions implicated. 
And ultimately the bid would have required approval by 
a shareholders' vote of the target, Unocal, with or without 
the recommendation of the Unocal board. Again, to outside 
observers, this may seem to be an insigdicant process, or at 
least one where Unocal shareholders could have been bribed 
with an all cash Chinese offer (that "bribe" being financed, 
directly and indirectly, by the PRC's treasury). Yet, that under- 
standing does not take into account what has been business as 
usual for the largest and most privileged Chinese state-owned 
enterprises in the decade or so that they have grown to their 
current size and ambition. Never, in the internal Chinese 
domestic markets, have players of the size and influence of 
a CNOOC implemented transactions (including large scale 
corporate M&A or even ~ublic  markets financing transactions) 
other than in accordance with the explicit command and say- 
so of the central government (or its line-ministries), without 
any real thought of what target shareholders might think, or 
public rules and regulations, much less contractual constraints, 
designed to inform participants' behavior and protect owners. 
By seeking to acquire the shares of Unocal, CNOOC   laced 
itself at the relative mercy of the many shareholders of Unocal 
wh-regardless of the relentless public relations campaigns 
being fought by both CNOOC and Chevron-had real 
decision-making power in respect of CNOOC's ambitions. 
We're all rule ablders new . . . 
CNOOC's bid for Unocal then placed "China Inc." into a brave 
new world, and entangled a previously unconstrained, state- 
created, oil giant in a web of laws and regulations governing 
everything from internal corporate governance to external 
market transactions. Whether or not people in the United 
States recognize this immediate1 or understand the deep W 
and abiding effect such coddtrahts and proaedur&i yill have 
on the behavior of Chinese corporations as they step into the 
world, the fact is certain. It is for this reason that ariy late-stage 
denial of a successful offer for Unocal by CFIUS in the United 
II 
States (were CNOOC to have gained approval of the deal at 
the ~ n a c a l  shareholder level)-n anything other than legitimate 
and wall-considered national security grounds-would have been a 
disaster for:'the ongoing socialization of CNOOC and "China 
Inc." An unreasoned denial by a supposedly objective ,U. S. 
agency would have signaled that the laws and Fernance rules 
which CNOOC and other Chinese corporate actors are just 
coming to terms with do not really matter &in thest.)le I" 
of many Chinese ministries which have in the past denie'd or 
limited foreign investment in China on-an entirely discretionary 
(or plainly xenophobic) basis--raw political power, rhetorical 
heat, and foreign "threatn concepts rule the day That would be 
a terrible lesson for China's emergent c o m p e s  to learn at 
this time in world history, or more importantly, from such a 
teacher. 
China is changing domestically, and specifically in the way it 
is being governed by rule of law, as opposed to pure political 
or *bureaucratic power. Of course, much of this change is due 
to organic development inside China as its economic system 
comes to resemble more closely a market economy, and partici- 
pants in that economy demand property and contractual rights, 
and a stable legal sy&em to protect those rights. However, these 
domestic legal system changes are alsdclearly due to China's 
increasing involvement in the global market for ownership 
interests and corporate control of industrial and service proper- 
ties. Without doubt, China has worked hard over more than 20 
years to implement 'legal construction" at home. However, it is 
equally certain that the effect of China's "Going Out Strategy," 
and the resulting entanglement with external legal require- 
ments and norms, is having a direct effect in binding China 
and Chinese actors to radically different ways of acting inside 
China-ways which affect everything from internal boardroom 
dynamics, the status and powers of the previously ignored 
minority shareholder, and the individual acting to protect his or 
her rights "under law." 
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